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INTRODUCTION
The recent sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic Church has put
the enforceability of confidentiality agreements in settlement under
1
the microscope. For years, the Church used confidential settlements
2
to silence abuse victims. Although these agreements protected the
identity of the victim, they also concealed the identities of the priests
3
who often continued to serve at their parishes or other ministries.
For example, in 1997, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany paid a
confidential settlement of just under one million dollars to a man
who alleged that “he had been sexually abused for six years” by a
4
priest “who regularly plied him with drugs and alcohol.” The
settlement fell just below the diocese’s one million dollar ceiling;
above that amount it must seek the consent of its finance counsel, an
eight-member board composed of the diocesan bishop and seven lay
people, designed to provide accountability for the diocese’s
5
decisions. Thus, the settlement was entirely insulated from any
public scrutiny, allowing the abusive priest to remain anonymous and
6
perhaps continue in his position.
∗
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1
See Laurie Goodstein, Albany Diocese Settled Abuse Case for Almost $1Million, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2002, at B1. The archdioce’s alleged failure to report instances of
sexual abuse involving former priest John Geoghan acted as a catalyst as much as any
other single event for national debate on sexual abuse involving priests. Ralph
Ranalli, Judge at Center of Geoghan Case Considered a ‘Fresh-Air Person,’ BOSTON GLOBE,
May 8, 2002, at A17. Approximately 300 lawsuits have been filed nationwide alleging
sexual abuse by church officials. Fred Bayles, Abuse Victims Flock to Lawyers, USA
TODAY, July 31, 2002, at 1D.
2
Goodstein, supra note 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Charter for the Protection of
Children
and
Young
People
Revised
Edition,
Preamble,
available
at
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Recently, however, as the sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic
Church has escalated in the media, there has been a public call for
7
accountability. A recent survey found that “at least 850 U.S. priests
have been accused of sexual misconduct with minors since the early
8
1960’s.” Because most victims signed confidentiality agreements, the
Church has never had to disclose either the number of settlements or
9
their cost. Financial experts, however, estimate that settlements have
cost the Church between four hundred million to one billion dollars
10
over the past two decades.
At least two courts have begun to question the propriety of
11
enforcing confidential settlements involving sexual abuse by priests.
http://www.usccb.org/bishops/charter.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2003) [hereinafter
Charter] (“In the past, secrecy has created an atmosphere that has inhibited the
healing process and, in some cases, enabled sexually abusive behavior to be
repeated.”); see also Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing eighty-four lawsuits pending
against former priest John Geoghan).
7
See Walter V. Robinson, Crisis in the Church/Judicial Criticism; Conn. Courts Helped
Hide Abuse, Judge Says, BOSTON GLOBE, June 14, 2002, at A1. The United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops recently adopted national standards addressing
sexual abuse of minors by priests. See generally Charter, supra note 6. See also Diocese
Settles Sex Abuse Claims by Paying $880,000 in Camden, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2003, at
B7; Iver Peterson, Bishops Agree to New Rules on Reporting of Sex Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
3, 2002, at B5. Article 3 of the Charter provides that “Diocese/eparchies will not
enter into confidentiality agreements except for grave and substantial reasons
brought forward by the victim/survivor and noted in the text of the agreement.”
Charter, supra note 6, at Article 3.
8
Cathy Lynn Grossman, Advocates Withdraw from Suit vs. Bishops, USA TODAY,
June 10, 2002, at 3A.
9
Goodstein, supra note 1 (stating that confidential settlements have been the
norm in sexual abuse cases for years). Settlements under one million dollars did not
go before the Dioceses’ finance counsels, thus, insulating the settlement and its
amount from disclosure. See Goodstein, supra note 1.
10
Gary Strauss, What Happens if There’s a Lot Less in the Plate?, USA TODAY, Aug. 1,
2002, at 8D. Generally, if a confidentiality agreement is broken, the victim or the
victim’s family forfeits a substantial portion of the settlement. See Goodstein, supra
note 1. Recently, however, many victims and lawyers have broken confidentiality
agreements with little fear of repercussions due to a current climate that is sharply
critical of the Catholic Church’s alleged cover-up. Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Price of
Broken Vows of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2002, § 1 at 20 (stating that many victims
have broken confidentiality agreements and have not been sued). Also, many victims
have filed class-action lawsuits against the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and
dioceses to void confidentiality agreements. Grossman, supra note 8.
11
See, e.g., In re Application of the New York Times for Vacating Sealing Orders,
Vacating Protective Orders and Requiring Filing of Discovery Materials, No.
X06CV020170932S, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1634, at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8,
2002) (unsealing documents in twenty-three cases involving sexual abuse of minors
by priests based on clear public interest in disclosure) [hereinafter In re New York
Times]; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Clerk of Suffolk County Super. Ct., No. 01-5588-F,
2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 6, at *30-32 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 4, 2002) (terminating
impoundment of confidential documents involving clergy sexual abuse based on
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In a recent unpublished opinion, Connecticut Superior Court Judge
Robert F. McWeeny accused the Connecticut judiciary of complicity
in the Diocese of Bridgeport’s efforts to cover up the extent of clergy
12
sexual abuse. Judge McWeeny, who ordered that seven boxes of
documents containing information regarding confidential settlement
13
of sexual abuse cases be unsealed, criticized what he called “a
judicial model of cooperation with the Diocese in endlessly delaying
litigation, sealing files and coercing victims into non-disclosure
14
settlements.” Judge McWeeny added that the Connecticut Appellate
Court’s decision to delay release of the documents on the basis of an
appeal by the diocese was “elevating institutional interests in covering
up a scandal over the legitimate public interest in the issue of the
15
Judge
Church’s response to sexual abuse of minors by priests.”
McWeeny then asked if “it [can] seriously be maintained that secrecy
16
at all costs was a wise or effective policy?”
The alleged Catholic Church cover-up is only one example of
the danger of routine enforcement of confidential settlement
contracts without any consideration of the public’s best interests.
Although courts generally will not interfere with parties’ freedom to
17
contract as they see fit, in limited instances, courts have withheld
18
enforcement in the name of public policy. Increasingly, however,
public interest and the First Amendment); Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing Judge
Constance M. Sweeney’s decision to order the release of thousands of documents
from sexual abuse suits against former priest John Geoghan).
12
Robinson, supra note 7; see also In re New York Times, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1634, at *11 (unsealing documents involving clergy sexual abuse).
13
See In re New York Times, 2002 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1634, at *11.
14
See Robinson, supra note 7.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 610-11 (1936) (stating that
“[f]reedom of contract is the general rule and restraint the exception”). But see also
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 392-93 (1937) (holding that freedom of
contract is not an absolute right and it may be restricted when in the public interest);
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract
Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116-18 (1988) (discussing the public policy exception as
a “rare limitation on the freedom of contract”).
18
See, e.g., Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ill. 1981)
(allowing a claim for retaliatory discharge because public policy favors reporting
criminal offenses); Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l Arena,
386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (stating that judges should not be
“restricted to the conventional sources of positive law (constitutions, statutes and
judicial decisions)” and “are frequently called upon to discern the dictates of sound
social policy and human welfare based on nothing more than their own personal
experience and intellectual capacity”); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Ed., 542 N.E.2d 663
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to enforce a confidentiality agreement protecting
teacher’s pedophilia). See generally Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35
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courts have become reluctant to interfere with contracts or to craft
broad social policy in the absence of a clear, legislative articulation of
19
the policies at stake.
This Comment suggests that courts should adopt a more active
role in shaping public policy by refusing to honor confidentiality
agreements that threaten public safety, even in the absence of an
authoritative legislative declaration. Part I examines the recent case
20
Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael, which suggests a useful judicial
21
Part II briefly
approach for evaluating non-disclosure contracts.
discusses the evolution of the public policy exception to contract
enforcement. Part III considers the balancing approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (the “Second Restatement”),
which provides guidelines for determining whether a non-disclosure
22
provision is contrary to public policy.
Part IV examines the
employment-at-will doctrine, an area in which courts have taken a
23
more active approach and carved out a public policy exception.
COLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935) (arguing that the modern statutory regime forces judges
to act as mere arbiters of statutory law rather than framers of public policy). See also
infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
179 cmt. a, b (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Historically, judges defined public
policy based on their own perception of protecting public welfare. See RESTATEMENT
§ 179 cmt. a. Some important policies developed by judges over centuries, include
“the policies against restraint of trade, impairment of domestic relations, and
interference with duties owed to individuals.” Id. Today, public policy is generally
defined by the legislature, in part, because it is equipped with superior resources to
conduct investigations of the public interest. See RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b.
Legislators, however, are often unaware of the contract law problems that may arise
in connection with legislation. Id.
19
See, e.g., Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1945) (declining to
invalidate government eminent domain contracts based merely on the gross disparity
between the original cost of the property and the government’s purchase price
because Congress did not pass legislation allowing private citizens greater recovery);
Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) (declining to
recognize a claim for wrongful discharge because the legislature had not yet done
so). See also RESTATEMENT §179 cmt. b (explaining that judges today must carefully
examine the relevant legislative scheme and legislative history in order to guide their
decisions on public policy).
20
780 A.2d 1006 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding a hospital liable for breaching
a non-disclosure contract that protected a nurse’s personnel records after carefully
considering the incidental effects enforcement could have on public health and
safety); see also supra PART I (discussing Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael).
21
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 154-61.
22
RESTATEMENT § 178 (articulating a balancing test for determining whether to
enforce a contract).
23
See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81 (holding that a claim for retaliatory
discharge existed because public policy favors reporting criminal offenses);
Peterman v. Int’l Bd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27-28 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(recognizing non-statutory wrongful discharge claim). See also EMPLOYMENT LAW,
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 265 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 2d ed. vol. 2 1999)
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Part V then considers more specifically the whistleblowing exception
to the employment-at-will doctrine, especially where confidentiality
24
agreements are at issue. This area is a particularly useful analog
because courts must balance the public’s interest in disclosure and
the private contractual interests in secrecy.
Finally, Part VI of this Comment suggests a new approach for
evaluating non-disclosure agreements that threaten the public
welfare. As the Second Restatement suggests, courts should first
25
reference the relevant statutory provisions as guideposts. Second,
courts should determine whether, in light of the statutory scheme,
the legislature has explicitly contemplated the policy questions before
them. This analysis should roughly mirror federal preemption
26
analysis.
Essentially, the courts should determine whether the
relevant statutory scheme effectively “preempts” an independent,
27
discretionary decision. In the absence of such “preemption,” courts
should then perform the Second Restatement balancing test,
weighing the potential adverse third-party effects of enforcement
28
against an individual’s rights to privacy and freedom of contract.
Courts should focus on whether the agreement creates a substantial
29
health or safety danger outweighing enforcement. This approach
provides a framework for guided judicial activism, emphasizing a
judge’s duty to consider the best interests of the public before
enforcing a confidential settlement contract.

[hereinafter Rothstein] (discussing the erosion of the employment at will doctrine).
24
Rothstein, supra note 23, §§ 8.9, 8.11.
25
RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b (1981).
26
Under federal preemption analysis, courts determine whether a scheme of
federal regulation displaces a state constitutional or statutory remedy. See Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983)
(describing the three categories of federal preemption analysis);
see also Candice S. Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
Rev. 687, 699-700 (1991) (describing federal preemption analysis).
27
See infra Part VI (discussing preemption as a model); see also RESTATEMENT §
178 cmt. a. (explaining that if legislation is found to be valid and applicable, courts
must follow its legislative mandate).
28
RESTATEMENT § 178; see also Stewart J. Schwab, Searching for Public Policy: The
Misguided Demand for Statutory Violations, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1957-58 (1996)
(arguing that courts should focus on the potential adverse third-party effects of
enforcement).
29
Carol M. Bast, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?, 25
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 672 (1999) (asserting that public health and safety is
perhaps the most important in the hierarchy of public policies).
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I. GIANNECCHINI V. HOSPITAL OF ST. RAPHAEL: STATUTORY ANALYSIS
AND NON-DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
Michael Giannecchini worked as a nurse at the Hospital of St.
Raphael (the “Hospital”) in New Haven, Connecticut from early 1992
through March of 1993, when the Hospital terminated his
30
employment.
In memorializing Giannecchini’s dismissal, the
Hospital’s director of personnel (the “Director”) executed a
document containing a “Remarks” section evaluating Giannecchini’s
31
job performance. The document rated Giannecchini as “‘Average’
with respect to ‘Attitude’, ‘Personality’ and ‘Attendance’ and ‘Below
32
Average’ with respect to ‘Ability’ and ‘Industry.’” Most significantly,
the document also indicated that Giannecchini had committed
33
“[s]everal serious medication errors.”
Upon dismissal, Giannecchini immediately obtained an attorney
34
who successfully negotiated a non-disclosure agreement.
The
agreement provided that future employers could not obtain the
35
information contained in the Director’s personnel evaluation.
Thus, the “Settlement Agreement and Release” essentially expunged
all references to Giannecchini’s termination and the reasons for such
36
dismissal. In addition, Giannecchini retained the right to sue for
breach of contract should the Hospital disseminate his personnel file
37
without permission.
Giannecchini then applied for a position with the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs Hospital (the “VA”) in West Haven and listed the
38
Hospital as a former employer. As part of its standard application
process, the VA required Giannecchini to sign an “Authorization for
Release of Information,” allowing the VA to inquire into the
39
applicant’s educational background and professional qualifications.
30

Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1006.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id. Non-disclosure agreements, also known as confidentiality agreements, are
“instrument[s] to protect and preserve trade secrets and other valuable confidential
information. Such agreements typically arise in employment relationships.” See 2
MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 13:3 (2002); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin
& Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 152-54 (1998)
(discussing the increasing use of secrecy clauses).
35
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1009.
36
Furthermore, in requests from inquiring employers, the Hospital’s disclosures
were limited to dates of service, title, position, and salary information. Id.
37
Id. at 1009.
38
Id. at 1010.
39
Id.
31
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The release also shielded from liability all those who provided
40
information.
The VA then sent the Hospital a letter requesting information
41
and attached a copy of the authorization. In response, the Director
released Giannecchini’s personnel file, including the negative
information contained in the “Remarks” section of the termination
42
document. As a result of the Director’s disclosures, the VA did not
43
hire Giannecchini.
Giannecchini commenced an action against the Hospital for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, and
44
At summary judgment, the court found for
defamation.
Giannecchini on the breach of contract claim, holding the Hospital
liable for the Director’s unauthorized disclosures, and found in favor
45
of the Hospital as to the other counts. The court was satisfied that
40

Id. at 1011. The release provided:
In order for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to assess and
verify my educational background, professional qualifications and
suitability for employment, I:
Authorize the VA to make inquiries concerning such
information about me to my previous employer(s), current
employer, educational institutions, State licensing boards,
professional liability insurance carriers, other professional
organizations and/or persons, agencies, organizations or
institutions listed by me as references, and to any other
appropriate sources to whom the VA may be referred by those
contacted or deemed appropriate;
Authorize release of such information and copies of related
records and/or documents to VA officials; “Release from
liability all those who provide information to the VA in good
faith and without malice in response to such inquiries; and
Authorize the VA to disclose to such persons, employers,
institutions, boards or agencies identifying and other
information about me to enable the VA to make such inquiries.

Id.
41

Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1009-10.
45
Id. at 1013-16. The non-disclosure agreement provided that, “Any and all
references in said file(s) to an involuntary termination of the employment of
Giannecchini will be expunged.” Id. at 1013. The Hospital had plainly agreed to
“remove” any information related to involuntary termination from Giannecchini’s
personnel file under § 31-128e. Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128e (2001).
Thus, the court held that Giannecchini was statutorily permitted to assume that the
Hospital had already removed this information when he signed the authorization
and the Hospital’s unauthorized disclosures constituted a breach of the nondisclosure contract. Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1013-16. The court stated:
the “authorization” must be read with Giannecchini’s legitimate
expectations—expectations legitimized by the provisions of positive
42
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the legislature intended that this type of non-disclosure provision
should be enforced as part of a “comprehensive legislative scheme . . .
dealing with the integrity and disclosure of employee personnel files”
46
and based its ruling on two statutory provisions.
47
Setting the issue of the authorization aside, the court
considered whether the Hospital had breached the non-disclosure
48
agreement.
The court, however, first examined Connecticut
49
50
General Statute Sections 31-128e and 31-128f to determine
law—in mind. In light of both the contract he had signed and the
provisions of §§ 31-128e and 31-128f, Giannecchini could legitimately
expect that references to his involuntary termination would no longer
be contained in his file. We now know, of course, that this was not the
case, but when he signed the “authorization” he had no way of knowing
this. He was not the party maintaining the file. He had the right both
contractual and statutory—to count on the hospital keeping its word.
For this reason, his “authorization” did not authorize the disclosure of
references to his involuntary termination.
Id. at 1014. The court noted, however, that numerous unflattering references to
Giannecchini’s ability and industry were outside the ambit of paragraph 2 of the
agreement, and were instead controlled by paragraph 3. Id. Although this
information was presumptively confidential, it was still “contained” in the personnel
file under § 31-128e. Id. (discussing § 31-128e). Thus, the Hospital was permitted to
disclose this information under the authorization. Id.
46
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-128e, f (2001)).
47
Id. at 1010; see also supra note 45 (discussing the effect of the authorization).
48
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1010.
49
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128e (2001). The statute states the following:
If upon inspection of his personnel file or medical records an
employee disagrees with any of the information contained in such file
or records, removal or correction of such information may be agreed
upon by such employee and his employer. If such employee and
employer cannot agree upon such removal or correction then such
employee may submit a written statement explaining his position.
Such statement shall be maintained as part of such employee’s
personnel file or medical records and shall accompany any transmittal
or disclosure from such file or records made to a third party.
Id.
50
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-128f (2001). The statute states that as follows:
No individually identifiable information contained in the personnel
file or medical records of any employee shall be disclosed by an
employer to any person or entity not employed by or affiliated with the
employer without the written authorization of such employee except
where the information is limited to the verification of dates of
employment and the employee’s title or position and wage or salary or
where the disclosure is made: (1) To a third party that maintains or
prepares employment records or performs other employment-related
services for the employer; (2) pursuant to a lawfully issued
administrative summons or judicial order, including a search warrant
or subpoena, or in response to a government audit or the investigation
or defense of personnel-related complaints against the employer; (3)
pursuant to a request by a law enforcement agency for an employee’s
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whether the agreement could be enforced consistent with public
51
policy. Section 31-128e provides that an employer and employee
may agree to remove or correct any disputed information in a
personnel file and, in the event that an agreement cannot be
reached, the employee may submit a written explanation that must be
52
attached to the file. Generally, Section 31-128f provides that, absent
the written authorization of the employee, employers should not
disclose information from a personnel file other than verification of
53
dates of employment, title, and wage or salary.
After hearing
arguments from both sides, the court determined that the
Connecticut legislature had explicitly considered all issues regarding
54
disclosure of employee personnel records. Thus, the court held that
55
the Hospital had breached its agreement with Mr. Giannecchini.
Significantly, the court articulated a broader concern regarding
56
the societal impact of this type of non-disclosure agreement. The
court was concerned that potential patients were unrepresented at
the bargaining table when the agreement was executed. The court
emphasized that patients are utterly dependent on the competence
57
of healthcare professionals. Although this type of non-disclosure
agreement may expeditiously resolve a conflict between the
contracting parties, it also exposes society to significant risks, such as
58
treatment by incompetent healthcare professionals.
The court’s analysis illustrates the proper role that public policy
and legislation should play when courts evaluate non-disclosure
contracts. Rather than mechanically enforcing the contract, the

home address and dates of his attendance at work; (4) in response to
an apparent medical emergency or to apprise the employee’s physician
of a medical condition of which the employee may not be aware; (5) to
comply with federal, state or local laws or regulations; or (6) where the
information is disseminated pursuant to the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement. Where such authorization involves medical
records the employer shall inform the concerned employee of his or
his physician’s right of inspection and correction, his right to withhold
authorization, and the effect of any withholding of such authorization
upon such employee.
Id.
51

§§ 31-128e, f.
§ 31-128e.
53
§ 31-128f.
54
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011.
55
Id. at 1014.
56
Id. at 1010.
57
Id.
58
See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 171-91 (discussing the public policy
dangers of routinely enforcing confidentiality agreements).
52
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court recognized the adverse impact that enforcement could have on
public welfare and referenced the relevant statutory provisions for
59
guidance.
Essentially, the question that the Giannecchini court
considered, and other courts should consider, is whether nondisclosure agreements can be enforced consistent with public policy,
60
particularly when they implicate public health and safety.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION: THE DECLINE
OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN SHAPING PUBLIC POLICY
As an early English court observed, public policy “is a very unruly
horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will
61
carry you.” The judicial conception of public policy has proved an
amorphous, ever-changing concept, characterized by uncertainty and
62
unpredictability.
The power to invalidate contracts based on public policy can be
63
traced to the English common-law. For many years, the judiciary
was the embodiment of the public conscience and, as such, dictated
64
the contours of public policy. The birth of the modern regulatory
65
regime, however, altered the public policy landscape. In this new
regime, the legislature has replaced the judiciary as “the authoritative
denouncer of conduct” because it possesses superior resources with
66
which to discern the prevailing mores of society. The legislature,
59

Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011.
Id. at 1010 (“[I]s judicial enforcement of . . . the . . . agreement . . . consistent
with public policy?”).
61
Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (quoted in Giannecchini,
780 A.2d at 1010).
62
1 W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 675 (5th ed. 1874). For a
more detailed discussion of the public policy doctrine, see generally Gellhorn, supra
note 18; John Shand, Unblinkering the Unruly Horse: Public Policy in the Law of Contract,
30 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 144 (1972); George A. Strong, The Enforceability of Illegal Contracts,
11 HASTINGS L.J. 347 (1961).
63
See Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 278-79 (Md. 1854) (holding that when there is
a conflict between private contractual rights and public policy, the public policy is
paramount); see also Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Wash. Nat’l
Arena, 386 A.2d 1216, 1228 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (“From the dawn of the
common law tradition in England, courts have refused to implement those private
contractual undertakings which, when measured against the prevailing mores and
moods of society, contravene judicial perceptions of so-called ‘public policy.’”)
(citing 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON 19 (Thomas ed. 1827)); Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679 (discussing the
public policy exception at English common-law); Percy H. Winfield, Public Policy in
the English Common Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 76, 79 (1928).
64
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679; see also RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. a, b.
65
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679.
66
Id.
60

2003

COMMENT

855

however, often makes policy decisions with little understanding of
67
possible contract law implications.
Walter Gellhorn argues that the modern statutory regime
relegates judges to the role of interstitialists; that is, judges act merely
to fill in gaps in statutory language rather than to craft broad social
68
policy.
Thus, statutes, not judicial decisions, have become the
69
embodiment of the public conscience. Gellhorn asserts that the
greatest problem with this dichotomous approach is that most judges
choose to mechanically apply statutes, ignoring the reality that the
legislature is often unaware of the effects such proclamations can
70
have on contract law. As a result, public policy is confused further
71
by counterintuitive results, or what Gellhorn calls “patent inanities.”
Gellhorn advocates instead that although statutes must be “the
starting point of the judges’ excursion into territory uncharted,”
courts should use statutes only as a factor when scrutinizing a

67

See RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b (“When proscribing conduct, however,
legislators seldom address themselves explicitly to the problems of contract law that
may arise in connection with such conduct.”); see also Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684.
68
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684. There is much debate regarding the role of
judges as interpreters of the law. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION (1997). In one of the most famous articulations of the limited role
that judges should play in creating law, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote:
I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but
they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to
molecular motions. A common law judge could not say I think the
doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not
enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited
jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of the common-law rules of
master and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920). Justice Scalia
advocates a philosophy of interpretation known as textualism. SCALIA, supra, at 22-23.
Textualism emphasizes that judges need not inquire into legislative intent; instead,
they should merely determine what the statute means as written. Id. at 23. Justice
Breyer, on the other hand, argues that courts should interpret statutes by inquiring
into legislative intent. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848-61 (1992).
69
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684.
70
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. a.
71
See, e.g., Short v. Bullion-Beck & Champion Mining Co., 57 P. 720 (Utah 1899).
In Short, the plaintiff worked twelve hour days and brought suit seeking to recover
overtime pay. Id. at 720. The court held that the employee, despite working
overtime at his employer’s request, was also guilty of violating a statute providing that
a maximum of eight hours a day could be worked in institutions for reduction or
refining of metal or ore. Id. at 721. Although it seems obvious that the statute was
intended to protect employees from abuses by their employer, the court held that
the employee was not entitled to the overtime pay because the contract for the
overtime hours contravened public policy as manifested by the statute. Id. at 723; see
also Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 688.
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72

contract that may violate public policy.
A few courts have assumed an even more active approach,
73
invalidating contracts in the absence of explicit statutory guidance.
74
For example, in Bowman v. Parma Board of Education, an Ohio Court
of Appeals panel unequivocally refused to enforce an agreement
precluding a school board from disclosing a teacher’s history of
75
pedophilia to other school districts. The court stated that “the only
possible conclusion under the circumstances of the instant case is
that the non-disclosure clause is void and unenforceable and no
76
cause of action will lie for its breach.” The Bowman court clearly
exercised its own judgment in recognizing its duty to protect the
interests of the public despite the absence of a clear legislative
77
articulation of the policies at stake.
Many courts, however, often exercise restraint in the absence of
78
legislative action.
Cautious not to offend separation of powers
principles, courts have cynically posited that “public policy . . . is but a
shifting and variable notion appealed to only when no other
argument is available, and which, if relied upon today, may be utterly
79
repudiated tomorrow.”
In fact, some courts have deliberately
72

Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685.
See, e.g., Palmateer v. Int’l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ill. 1981)
(allowing a retaliatory discharge claim based on public policy); Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at
1228 (stating that judges should not be restricted to positive law when crafting public
policy); Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Ed., 542 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
74
542 N.E.2d 663.
75
Id. at 666-67.
76
Id.
77
Id. Similarly, Connecticut Superior Court Judge McWeeny’s decision to order
disclosure of the secret documents related to the Church’s alleged cover-up of
rampant sexual abuse is motivated by a similar reluctance to allow behavior as
extreme as sexual abuse of minors to be contractually shielded from public
awareness. See Robinson, supra note 7.
78
See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983)
(declining to recognize wrongful discharge in the absence of legislative declaration);
Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. 1974) (disallowing a wrongful
discharge action, and asserting the importance of legislative or statutory guidance).
79
Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 1228 (quoting Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 62 A. 249,
251 (Md. 1905)). The Md.-Nat’l court explained that Maryland courts have
invalidated voluntary agreements on public policy grounds only sparingly, “[f]earing
the disruptive effect that invocation of the highly elusive public policy principle
would likely exert on the stability of commercial and contractual relations.” Id.
Maryland courts have only invoked public policy when the agreement was patently
offensive to “the common sense of the entire community.” Id. (citing Estate of
Woods, Weeks & Co., 52 Md. 520, 536 (Md. 1879)); see also Trupp v. Wolf, 24 Md.
App. 588, 616, cert. denied, 275 Md. 757 (1975). The court explained that judicial
reluctance to nullify voluntary contractual arrangements protects the clear public
interest in allowing private parties to contract freely. Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 1228-29
73
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ignored policy considerations, choosing instead to adopt a policy of
80
For
inaction in the absence of a clear legislative declaration.
81
instance, in Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., the court
declined to follow the modern trend toward recognizing a claim for
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee and decided instead to wait
82
for legislative action. Although the court recognized the tenuous
situation of an at-will employee, it declined the invitation to act
because, in the court’s opinion, it is the duty of the legislature to
83
resolve public policy issues. The court reasoned that the legislature
is ultimately in a better position to make a significant change in the
84
law.
Unfortunately, although modern courts and legislatures have
recognized that freedom of contract must sometimes yield to public
policy, albeit in rare circumstances, it remains unclear when public
85
policy actually suggests non-enforcement of certain contracts. The
balancing approach of the Second Restatement attempts to provide
judges with guidance in balancing public policy and contractual
86
guarantees.

(citing RESTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Ch. 14, at 46 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1977)).
Thus, the Md.-Nat’l court asserted that it is ultimately the court’s responsibility to
balance public and private interests in certainty when executing a contract against
those policies favoring non-enforcement. Id. at 1229; see also Muschany v. United
States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945) (“Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the
laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests.”) (citing Vidal v. Philadelphia, 43 U.S. 127, 197-98 (1844)).
80
See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa.
1974).
81
448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
82
Id. at 87.
83
Id. at 89.
84
Id. at 89-90.
85
See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878-79 (acknowledging that public policy lacks
a precise definition and asserting that public policy must be a matter that “strike[s]
at the heart of a citizen’s social rights, duties, and responsibilities”); Geary, 319 A.2d
at 180 (declining to define the parameters of at-will employment); see also Kostritsky,
supra note 17, at 116-18 (discussing the public policy exception as “a rare limitation
on the freedom of contract”). Kostritsky suggests that courts should consider
efficient deterrence as a method for deciding whether to invalidate contracts on
grounds of public policy. Kostritsky, supra note 17, at 121-22. The efficient
deterrence model suggests that the illegal contracts doctrine is wrongly rooted in
public policy. Id. at 117-21. Instead, Kostritsky posits that “a graduated relief
structure will maximize efficient deterrence—allocating the risk of nonenforcement to
the cheapest cost avoider, rather than to both parties in all instances.” Id. at 122.
This system, Kostritsky urges, conserves judicial resources and reframes the illegal
contracts doctrine to be compatible with traditional notions of autonomy and
freedom of contract. Id. at 163.
86
RESTATEMENT § 178.
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III. THE BALANCING APPROACH OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS
The First Restatement of Contracts articulated the traditional
rule regarding non-enforcement of a contract on grounds of public
87
policy. The First Restatement stated that: “[a] party to an illegal
bargain can neither recover damages for breach thereof, nor, by
rescinding the bargain, recover the performance . . . thereunder or
88
its value,” subject to various exceptions. The Second Restatement,
however, shifts away from emphasizing “illegal” contracts and focuses
instead on whether a contract is unenforceable as contrary to public
89
policy. The Second Restatement adopts a balancing test aimed at
guiding a judge’s determination as to whether a contract should be
90
unenforceable as contrary to public policy. The drafters suggest
that the courts “consider the importance of any policy as reflected in
91
legislation or judicial decision.”
Section 178 of the Second Restatement indicates that in
weighing the significance of the public policy, the court should
consider the following factors: 1) the strength of the policy as
embodied in legislation or decisions; 2) the likelihood that nonenforcement will further the policy at stake; and 3) the seriousness of
the misconduct at issue and its causal connection to the terms of the
92
contract.
Courts, however, should balance these considerations
against traditional contract concerns such as preserving parties’
justified expectations, any forfeiture that may result, and the possible
93
existence of a specific public interest favoring enforcement. Using
these factors to guide and manage its discretion, the court should
deny enforcement only if the public policy at stake “clearly
outweigh[s]” the necessity of preserving the integrity of traditional
94
contract law principles.
An analysis of Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
95
Commission v. Washington National Arena illustrates how the balancing
96
approach of the Second Restatement should be applied. In Md.87

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932).
Id. § 598; see also 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 7
(Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1995).
89
RESTATEMENT §§ 178, 179.
90
RESTATEMENT § 178.
91
WILLISTON, supra note 88, at 10 (discussing RESTATEMENT §§ 178, 179).
92
RESTATEMENT § 178.
93
Id.; see also WILLISTON, supra note 88, at 10.
94
RESTATEMENT §178 cmt. a, illus.1.
95
386 A.2d 1216 (Md. 1978).
96
Id.
88
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Nat’l, a taxpayer agreed to waive his right to contest any
determination by the Supervisor of Assessments concerning the
97
taxability of a parcel of land. Despite the agreement, the taxpayer
sued, arguing that any term contracting away an individual’s due
98
In holding that the
process rights is contrary to public policy.
noncontestability clause was not void as against public policy, the
Maryland Supreme Court balanced the public policy concerns
favoring non-enforcement of the contract against the policies
99
favoring enforcement. The court began by noting the “reluctance
on the part of the judiciary to nullify contractual arrangements on
public policy grounds” in order to protect the strong public interest
in allowing individuals to structure their own relationships through
100
contracts. The court then reasoned that the danger of enforcing a
clause that deprives a party of his right to appeal a judgment did not
“clearly and unequivocally outweigh the reasons for giving effect to
the plain and unambiguous intention of the parties manifested by the
101
language” of the provision.
Section 179 of the Second Restatement further clarifies the
102
balancing test. A contract term should not be enforced if indicated
103
in relevant legislation, or if the interests in enforcement are clearly
104
outweighed by the public welfare.
Although conceding that
legislators do not typically act with contract enforcement in mind, the
drafters rely on the notion that the legislature is in a better position
97

Id. at 1220.
Id. at 1221.
99
Id. at 1229.
100
Id. at 1228-29.
101
Md.-Nat’l, 386 A.2d at 1229.
102
RESTATEMENT § 179. Entitled “Bases of Public Opinion,” this section
enumerates the bases for carving out a public policy favoring non-enforcement. Id.
103
Id. § 178 cmt. a. The section states the following:
The term “legislation” is used here in the broadest sense to include any
fixed text enacted by a body with authority to promulgate rules,
including not only statutes, but constitutions and local ordinances, as
well as administrative regulations issued pursuant to them. It also
encompasses foreign laws to the extent they are applicable under
conflict of law rules.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 202, 203 (1971)).
104
Id. § 179. Section 179 elaborates three examples of well-established judicial
policies that may weigh against enforcement of a contractual provision: restraint of
trade, impairment of family relations, and interference with other protected
interests. Id. § 179 (b)(i), (ii), (iii). According to the comments and illustrations,
certain policies against enforcement were developed by judges on the basis of their
own perception of the significance of protecting the public in certain instances. Id. §
179 cmt. a. The examples listed in § 179(b) are “now rooted in precedents
accumulated over centuries.” Id.
98

860

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:845

105

than the judiciary to represent the public.
The drafters clarify,
106
Instead, the
however, that legislation should not be dispositive.
drafters urge that legislation should only be used to “enlighten
107
[judges]. . . concerning the specific policy to which it is relevant.”
Thus, despite emphasizing the necessity of legislation, judicial
discretion is preserved as a basis for non-enforcement of a
108
contractual provision.
In sum, the Second Restatement framework emphasizes
109
legislation as a judicial guidepost. It does not, however, completely
displace a judge’s exercise of independent discretion in the absence
of legislative guidance. Despite the comments to Section 179, which
clarify that legislation need not be controlling as to the disposition of
the case, courts have been reluctant to assume an active role in
110
defining public policy.
Rather than using legislation as an aid in
determining public policy, courts have typically declined to exercise
111
any independent discretion in policy determinations. These courts
have instead chosen to leave public policy determinations for
112
resolution by the legislature.
A notable exception to this judicial
restraint is the active role that courts play in carving out exceptions in

105

RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b; see also G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE
OF STATUTES 92-97 (1982), reprinted in RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS:
TEXT, MATERIALS, AND CASES, 175-80 (2d ed. 1996). Judge Calabresi asserts that
judges, as a result of the manner of their selection and lengthy terms, follow “longerrun majoritarian sentiments than . . . congressmen.” Id. Further, judges are more
likely to follow their own principles rather than being directly responsive to modern
sentiments. Id. at 176-77. Judge Calabresi, however, does not go so far as to assert
that judges are entirely immune from “majoritarian pressures.” Id. at 177. See
generally ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953).
106
RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id. §179.
110
See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 87 (declining to recognize the tort of abusive or
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee despite the modern trend towards
recognition); Geary, 319 A.2d at 180 (disallowing a wrongful discharge claim despite
the danger of allowing a possibly defective product to remain on the market);
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9 (citing Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472
(Md. 1981)) (“[R]ecognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a basis for a
judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a
given case, and declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative
branch.”).
111
See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89 (declining to recognize a cause of action for
wrongful discharge because public policy is more appropriately resolved by the
legislature). See also Geary, 319 A.2d at 180-81 (disallowing a wrongful discharge
claim because it was not embodied in legislation or statute).
112
See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; see also Geary, 319 A.2d at 180.
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the employment-at-will context.
IV. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT: CARVING OUT A PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION
Courts actively have carved out public policy exceptions in the
113
employment context. Most notably, courts have created exceptions
114
to the employment-at-will doctrine.
Horace G. Wood is credited
115
with formulating the employment-at-will doctrine, which provides
that an employee hired for an indefinite term may be freely
116
Grounded initially
terminated for any reason or no reason at all.
on “the concept of freedom of contract and a laissez-faire
socioeconomic view,” the traditional rule gained acceptance towards
117
the end of the nineteenth century.
For many years, the courts
continued to adhere to this approach, choosing not to interfere with
the power of either party to freely terminate an employment
118
contract.
Legislative developments in the beginning of the twentieth
119
century, however, extended greater protections to employees. First,
120
after the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935,
collective bargaining agreements often contained “just cause”

113

See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81; Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28. See also
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9.
114
See supra note 113.
115
See generally HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
(1877). There is debate regarding whether Horace G. Wood actually invented the atwill doctrine. See Munoz v. Expedited Freight Sys., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1181, 1185
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing LEX K. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1991)). The six cases that
Wood relied on when formulating the doctrine do not actually support the
proposition. Id.
116
See generally WOOD, supra note 115.
117
For example, in the seminal case of Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Co.,
a railroad employee challenged his dismissal, alleging that he was discharged
“maliciously and without probable cause.” 21 A. 157, 157 (Md. 1891). The court
emphasized that the railroad was free to discharge an employee with or without
cause in the absence of a contract to the contrary. Id. at 158. The court discounted
the employee’s arguments concerning the unfairness of his dismissal and added that
it could not see “that the questions of malice and want of probable cause have
anything to do with the case.” Id.; see also Reid Anthony Muoio, An Independent
Auditor’s Suit for Wrongful Discharge, 58 ALB. L. REV. 413, 429 (1994) (discussing the
development of an at-will employee’s right to sue for wrongful discharge).
118
See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 87; Geary, 319 A.2d at 180; see also Rothstein,
supra note 23, § 8.1 (“For the first half of the twentieth century the employment at
will rule was virtually unchallenged . . . .”).
119
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1.
120
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988).
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121

clauses.
Second, the emergence of state and local civil service
protection laws insulated even more workers from arbitrary
122
discharge.
Later, civil rights legislation re-enforced the principle
that an employer’s discretion in hiring and firing must sometimes
123
give way to societal interests.
Beginning in the latter half of the twentieth century, tort and
124
contract theories gradually eroded the doctrine. Recognizing that
the economic underpinnings of the at will doctrine had changed
125
drastically, courts began to carve out an exception to the at-will
126
employment relationship.
Peterman v. International Brotherhood of
127
Teamsters was “the first major judicial crack in the employment at
128
In Peterman, the court recognized a non-statutory cause
will rule.”
of action based on public policy when a union local dismissed an
121

Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Once the
common-law cornerstone of employment relations not covered by either civil service
laws or the National Labor Relations Act, the at-will doctrine has been significantly
eroded by both tort and contract theories . . . .”). The major contract theories that
eroded the at-will doctrine are: “(1) breach of an express or implied promise,
including representations made in employee handbooks; (2) discharge in violation
of public policy; and (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.” Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1. Courts also began to use torts such as
“interference with economic advantage or contractual relations, fraud and
misrepresentation, invasion of privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress” in the employment context. Id.
125
The Geary court explained that since the time of Henry, “huge corporate
enterprises . . . have emerged . . . [that] wield an awesome power over their
employees.” Geary, 319 A.2d at 176. In response to the emergence of huge
corporate enterprises, F. Tannenbaum, in his treatise, A Philosophy of Labor, argued:
we have become a nation of employees. We are dependent upon
others for our means of livelihood, and most of our people have
become completely dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they
lose every resource, except for the relief supplied by the various forms
of social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people upon
others for all of their income is something new in the world. For our
generation, the substance of life is in another man’s hands.
Id. (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951)).
126
See, e.g., Geary, 319 A.2d at 176; Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425, 427-28 (Ind. 1973) (holding that plaintiff was retaliatorily discharged for filing a
workers compensation claim); Monge v. Beeber Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H.
1974) (holding that “[a] termination by the employer of a contract of employment at
will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation . . . constitutes a
breach of the employment contract”); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 515-16 (Or.
1975) (holding that plaintiff was wrongfully discharged for serving jury duty);
Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28.
127
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
128
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.1.
122
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129

agent for refusing to commit perjury.
The court emphasized that
the employer’s actions violated the clear public interest in
130
encouraging truthful testimony.
Today, nearly every state recognizes the public policy exception
to the employment-at-will rule in some form, whether at common law
131
Although each state implements the public policy
or by statute.
exception differently, most cases involving the exception can be
grouped into one of four broad, non-exclusive categories: (1)
refusing to perform unlawful acts; (2) reporting illegal activity
(whistleblowing); (3) exercising legal rights; and (4) performing
132
public duties.
Despite recognizing a public policy exception to the
employment-at-will rule, many courts still remain reluctant to restrain
an employer’s broad discretion to fire in the absence of an explicit
133
legislative declaration to the contrary.
For example, the Murphy
court declined to recognize the tort of abusive or wrongful discharge
of an at-will employee because the “perception and declaration of
relevant public policy . . . [was] . . . best and more appropriately

129

Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28; see also Muoio, supra note 117, at 429 (internal
citation omitted).
130
Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28.
131
Rothstein, supra note 23, at 261-62. Every state except Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, New York, and Rhode Island recognize some type of public
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule. See id.; see also Muoio, supra note
117, at 430. A public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine has been
recognized in the following circumstances:
where an employee was fired for refusing to participate in an illegal
price fixing scheme, for failing to vote stock in accordance with dictates
of management, for refusing to “pack” insurance policies, for refusing
to make a commercial bribe, for threatening to notify the Food and
Drug Administration of an employer’s falsification of test results, for
refusing to pump bilges in violation of federal law, for refusing to sign
a false statement, for refusing to testify untruthfully in court, for
refusing to alter state-required pollution control reports, for
attempting to report a salesman’s improper conduct to the state
insurance commission, for union membership and activity, and for
filing a worker’s compensation claim, among others.
Rothstein, supra note 23, at 261-62.
132
Rothstein, supra note 23, at 261-62. For example, this Comment suggests that
courts should question the enforceability of non-disclosure provisions involving
medical care professionals. See supra PART II (discussing Giannecchini, 780 A.2d
1006).
133
See Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89 (declining to recognize a wrongful discharge
action in the absence of legislature guidance); see also Geary, 319 A.2d at 180
(declining to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge because of the
importance of legislative or statutory guidance).
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134

resolved by the legislative branch.”
Judges began to walk a
metaphoric tight rope in order to avoid acting without the stamp of
135
legislative approval. Also, in Geary v. United States Steel Corp., the
136
plaintiff was fired for voicing his concerns about a product’s safety.
The court disallowed a cause of action for wrongful discharge despite
its clear interest in protecting the public from the marketing of a
137
possibly defective product. The majority reluctantly conceded that
there may be situations where an employer’s discretion to discharge
must be restrained in the face of public policy concerns, noting:
[i]t may be granted that there are areas of an employee’s life in
which his employer has no legitimate interest. An intrusion into
one of these areas by virtue of the employer’s power of discharge
might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where
138
some recognized facet of public policy is threatened.

The court explicitly asserted, however, the importance of a statutorily
139
conferred right or “clear and compelling” mandate of public
140
policy.
In light of this dilemma, the Geary court fashioned a narrow
141
holding to avoid decisively resolving the case. The court stated that
the plaintiff’s policy argument did not rise to the level of a “clear and
142
compelling” mandate of public policy. The absence of a legislative
mandate justified the court’s decision not to define the parameters of
143
the employer’s privilege of hiring and firing employees.
The dissent attacked the majority’s reluctance to respond to the
144
realities of the twentieth century and criticized the majority’s
concerns about overburdening the courts with complex litigation
134

Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89.
319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
136
Id. at 175.
137
Id. at 181.
138
Id. at 185.
139
Id. at 180 (discussing Frampton, 297 N.E.2d at 427-28) (recognizing a nonstatutory cause of action for wrongful discharge when an employee was discharged
because she filed a claim against her employer under Indiana’s workmen’s
compensation statute).
140
Id.
141
Geary, 319 A.2d at 180. The Geary court, despite recognizing that the plaintiff
had sought to prevent the defendant from marketing a product that could be
dangerous, inferred that the company must have dismissed plaintiff because he
“made a nuisance of himself” and to preserve administrative order. Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 183 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (discussing Lawrence E. Blades, Employmentat-Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1418 (1967)).
135
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“[as] nothing more than an unarticulated fear of the mythological
145
The dissent argued that the court should
Pandora’s box.”
recognize that freedom of contract cannot insulate an employer’s
146
arbitrary and abusive actions.
In stressing the need for a case-bycase analysis, Justice Roberts emphasized that a court is obligated to
qualify even what appears to be an absolute right if it contravenes
147
public policy.
Justice Roberts then urged the court to “fulfill its
societal role and its responsibility to the public interest by
148
recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge.”
In sharp contrast to the timid views expressed by the Geary
149
majority, the court in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.
150
In
articulated perhaps the most expansive view of public policy.
Palmateer, the plaintiff alleged that he had been fired because he
supplied information to the authorities and agreed to cooperate in
151
the investigation of an employee’s criminal activity. Acknowledging
that the “Achilles heel” of retaliatory discharge cases is the lack of a
precise definition of public policy, the court posited that public
policy must be a matter that “strike[s] at the heart of a citizen’s social
152
rights, duties, and responsibilities.” In concluding that a claim for
retaliatory discharge existed, the court emphasized that public policy
153
clearly favors reporting criminal offenses.
Interestingly, the dissent in Palmateer echoed the concerns of the
154
Geary court.
The dissent feared that the decision would upset the
balance between employer and employee interests, forcing employers
to defend all personnel decisions against claims for retaliatory
155
discharge.
The dissent then argued that because the concept of
public policy is vague and uncertain, the judiciary should refrain
from interfering with the discretion of an employer in the absence of
156
a policy found in a legislative enactment.
Despite conceding that
the plaintiff’s conduct was at least commendable, the dissent
emphasized that such a claim should not be sustained “ in the vague
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 182 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 185 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Geary, 319 A.2d at 183 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Id. at 185 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981).
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878-79.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 884-85 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 885 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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belief that public policy requires that we all become ‘citizen crime157
fighters.’”
These cases illustrate the opposing judicial attitudes regarding
158
the appropriate role of legislation in shaping public policy.
As a
result of these two distinct approaches, no consistent public policy
159
doctrine has emerged.
Yet, at least some courts have been willing
to apply the public policy doctrine in the employment context,
limiting what would otherwise be unlimited employer discretion to
160
hire and fire employees.
Although the creation of a tort action in the employment
context is not perfectly analogous to carving out a public policy
defense to enforcement of a non-disclosure contract, in both contexts
the courts must resolve the tension between their duty to protect the
161
public and preserving the freedom of the parties.
Whether the
courts create an affirmative tort or allow a contract defense based on
public policy, the courts are making a judgment that there is
something problematic or unjust about enforcing a particular type of
contract.
In the employment context, the courts have made a
determination that, despite principles of freedom of contract, the at162
will doctrine may offend public policy in certain instances.
As a
result, the courts, and ultimately the legislature, have chosen to
undermine the at-will doctrine by carving out a public policy
163
exception.
This Comment suggests that courts should similarly
recognize that the harm that confidential settlement contracts have
on society clearly outweighs an individual’s privacy interests. In
addition, courts should recognize their broad discretion and duty to
protect the public even in the absence of a statutorily conferred right
or clear legislative declaration of the policy at stake. Thus, courts
should recognize public policy as an exception to the enforcement of
non-disclosure provisions which may prove harmful to public welfare.

157

Id. at 881 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
There are two distinct judicial attitudes towards articulating public policy. The
first is actively articulating public policy in response to social realities. See Geary, 319
A.2d at 180. The second is declining to frame public policy in the absence of
statutory or legislative guidance. See Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880; see also 1 W. STORY,
supra note 62, § 675.
159
See supra note 158.
160
See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81; Peterman, 344 P.2d 27-28.
161
See infra notes 192 & 214 and accompanying text.
162
See, e.g., Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 880-81; Peterman, 344 P.2d at 27-28. See also
Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9.
163
See supra note 162.
158
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V. WHISTLEBLOWING AS A MODEL
Whistleblowing is one of the most common forms of the public
164
policy exception. The whistleblower exception protects employees
165
who are discharged for reporting illegal or harmful activity.
Employers’ increasing use of confidentiality agreements over the last
ten years, however, undermines this protection; many recent cases
involve confidentiality provisions that prohibit employees from
166
As a result, these cases weigh contractual
blowing the whistle.
protections against the protections afforded by whistleblower
167
statutes.
This delicate balancing illustrates how courts should
resolve the tension between the public’s interest in disclosure and
private contractual interests in secrecy. In addition, whistleblowing is
a useful model because the federal government and all fifty state
legislatures have enacted legislation in response to judicial

164

Rothstein, supra note 23, § 8.9.
Id. § 8.11.
166
See, e.g., Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., 914 F.2d 556,
563 (4th Cir. 1990). In Sumitomo, the court laid out the following three-factor test for
assessing the reasonableness of confidentiality provisions:
1. Is the restraint on circumvention no broader than is necessary, from
the standpoint of the trade secret holder, to protect the holder from
the disclosure of its confidential information?
2. From the standpoint of the party that received the confidential
information, is the restraint reasonable in the sense that it is not
unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the legitimate efforts of that
party to conduct its business?
3. Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of sound public
policy?
Id.; see also Follmer, Rudzewicz & Co. v. Kosco, 362 N.W.2d 676, 683 (Mich. 1984)
(holding that courts should enforce confidentiality provisions only to the extent
reasonably necessary to protect the confidential information); Durham v. Stand-By
Labor, Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149-50 (Ga. 1973) (holding that courts should
determine whether “the restraint [on disclosure] is reasonably related to the
protection of information”); Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53, stating:
The use of secrecy clauses has been growing over the past ten years. At
the same time, there has been increased legislative and judicial activity
encouraging employees to come forward and blow the whistle when
the organizations for which they work engage in wrongdoing. These
trends to encourage and to thwart employee disclosures have led to
conflicts . . . in which the courts are asked to determine the
enforceability of whistleblowers’ confidentiality agreements.
At
present, it is unclear under what circumstances, and to what extent,
such provisions will be enforced.
Id.; see also Bast, supra note 29, at 639-42 (discussing how some courts carefully
scrutinize confidentiality agreements to ensure that protection is reasonable in light
of the information that is being shielded and the public interest).
167
See, e.g., Sumitomo, 914 F.2d at 563; Follmer, 362 N.W.2d at 683; Durham, 198
S.E.2d at 149-50. See also Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53.
165
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168

recognition of the whistleblower exception.

A. Whistleblower Legislation: Recommending Emphasis on Public
Health and Safety
Whistleblowing considerations played a role in the early judicial
169
erosions of the employment-at-will doctrine.
Widespread
encouragement of whistleblowing in order to protect the public
170
good, however, did not gain momentum until the 1980’s. Although
the same general objectives underlie all whistleblowing protections,
there is great inconsistency between the laws of each state and the
171
corresponding judicial interpretations.
At the core of whistleblowing analysis is the conflict between the
172
interests of the employer, the employee and society.
Ultimately,
whistleblowing endeavors to protect the public’s clear interest in
173
exposing, deterring, and curtailing wrongdoing.
Additionally,
Professor Carol Bast suggests that whistleblower protection is also
rooted in the basic moral principle that an employee has a right to
blow the whistle when an organization engages in illegal or immoral
174
conduct.
These propositions, however, only represent a small
168

See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 100 (2000). For examples of statutory
provisions, see Callahan & Dworkin, supra, at app. A (charting whistleblower
protections in all fifty states); Schwab, supra note 28, at 1957-58. Twenty-six states
have continued to recognize a whistleblowing public policy exception at commonlaw. See Bast, supra note 29, at 627. These twenty-six states are:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.
Id.
169
See, e.g., Peterman v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
See also supra note 26 and accompanying text; Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at
105-06.
170
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 99.
171
Id. at 99-100. Whistleblowing legislation, in general, follows one of two models:
those using incentives to encourage whistleblowing and those seeking to protect
against the retaliation of the employer. Id. at 100. Perhaps the most significant and
effective of federal whistleblower legislation is the False Claims Act (FCA), which
accomplishes its goals through a complex use of incentives. Id. (discussing FALSE
CLAIMS ACT, 31 U.S.C.S. § 231 (2003)) (revised § 3729). Most state legislatures,
however, have chosen to follow the anti-retaliation model, focusing instead on
deterring and uncovering wrongful conduct. Id. at 108-09.
172
Bast, supra note 29, at 660.
173
Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 100.
174
Bast, supra note 29, at 645 (discussing Nicholas M. Rongine, Toward a Coherent
Legal Response to the Public Policy Dilemma Posed by Whistleblowing, 23 AM. BUS. L.J. 280,
286 (1985)).
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portion of the complex considerations surrounding whistleblowing.
On the one hand, whistleblowing can interfere with an
employer’s traditional concerns for productivity, efficiency, and
authority over his employees, and may create the danger of false
176
negative publicity resulting from disclosures.
Moreover,
whistleblowing may obscure the employee’s inherent duties of
177
On the
obedience, loyalty, and confidentiality to his employer.
other hand, whistleblower protection enhances the employee’s job
178
security and expectations of fair treatment in the workplace.
Additionally, society can reap broad benefits from whistleblowing
when it safeguards public health and safety and discourages improper
179
or illegal conduct. If, however, employers act too cautiously in their
hiring and firing practices because of whistleblower protections, it
180
may harm the public by creating an incompetent workplace.
Interestingly, some courts only recognize the whistleblower
exception when the employee reports violations affecting public
181
health and safety.
For example, although New York has yet to
182
recognize a wrongful discharge action based on public policy, the
legislature has adopted twelve whistleblower-related statutes
183
emphasizing public health and safety.
The statutory scheme
requires the employee prove a clear connection between the conduct
175

Id.
See id. at 660-68.
177
See id. at 661, 663. Employees’ recognition and understanding of whistleblower
protections may cause them to dismiss the importance of their obligations to the
employer, such as loyalty and obedience. Id.
178
Id. at 666.
179
Id.
180
Bast is essentially arguing that whistleblower protections may
disproportionately chill employers from discharging employees for legitimate
reasons. See Bast, supra note 29, at 665-66.
181
See, e.g., Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 1988) (holding that an
employee must prove that a “a reasonably prudent person would have concluded the
employee’s co-worker or employer was engaged in activities in violation of rules,
regulations, or the law pertaining to public health, safety, and the general welfare”);
Mitishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 294, 295 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (holding
that public policy exception did not apply because the unfair labor practices that the
employee reported did not present a threat to public health and safety); Kraus v.
New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 216 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
182
See, e.g., Lobosco v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 751 N.E.2d 462, 464 (N.Y. 2001) (noting that
New York does not recognize the tort of wrongful discharge); Murphy v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 87 (N.Y. 1983) (declining to recognize a tort for abusive
or wrongful discharge). See also Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 115.
183
This statutory scheme creates a confusing array of standards regulating the
relationship between employers and employees. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(McKinney 2003); N.Y. CIV. LAW § 75-b (McKinney 2003); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740
(McKinney 2003) (covering whistleblowing involving certain health care workers).
176
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reported and the promotion of health and safety concerns.
185
Although New York courts resist the public policy exception and
186
the statutory scheme is complex, the emphasis on public welfare
and safety provides a useful paradigm.
Accordingly, the development of the whistleblower exception to
at-will employment is evidence that courts can actively carve out
187
public policy exceptions that effect a legislative response.
In
addition, tying the whistleblower exception to public health and
safety limits its application to instances where disclosure will actually
further a substantial public interest.
B. Whistleblowing and Confidentiality Agreements: A Delicate Balance

As mentioned above, the whistleblowing analysis is complicated
by employers’ increasing use of confidentiality agreements to protect
188
information from public exposure. Like any other contract clause,
however, a confidentiality agreement can be set aside based on public
189
policy.
Thus, despite the courts’ disinclination to interfere with
private parties’ freedom to define the contours of their relationships,
an employee who exposes an employer’s wrongful conduct in breach
of a non-disclosure contract may still legitimately argue that societal
184

Kraus, 216 A.D.2d at 116-18. For example, New York Labor Law Section
740(2)(a), provides as follows:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action against an
employee because such employee does any of the following:
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a
public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is
in violation of law, rule or regulation which violation creates and
presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety . . . .
§ 740(2)(a). An illustrative case is Kraus v. New Rochelle Hospital Medical Center, where
the hospital vice-president of nursing was terminated for following standard
procedure in reporting health violations; specifically, a doctor’s failure to properly
document or get informed consent before performing bronchoscopies. 260 A.D.2d
at 361. In order to establish a violation under New York Labor Law Section 740, the
nurse was required to prove that “the violation is one that creates and presents a
substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.” Id. at 364 (quoting §
740). In holding that the nurse had presented sufficient evidence to proceed, the
court emphasized that the doctor’s actions created a substantial and specific danger
because the procedure “can result in death, cardiac arrest, and hemorrhage.” Id. at
365. Contra Green v. Saratoga A.R.C., 233 A.D.2d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996);
Connolly v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 161 A.D.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
185
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
186
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
187
See Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 99-100 (discussing the emergence
of whistleblower protection in all fifty states).
188
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53.
189
Id. at 162.
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interests outweigh the employer’s interest in privacy.
Some commentators have attempted to reconcile the competing
interests at stake and offer creative approaches for determining the
191
enforceability of confidentiality agreements.
For example,
Professor Terry Morehead Dworkin analyzes the balancing approach
of the Second Restatement in an attempt to determine definitively
192
when the consequences of silence are too high. Professor Dworkin
advocates the use of a two-tiered inquiry for evaluating the strength of
193
a public policy.
First, Professor Dworkin emphasizes that both a
general analysis of public policies favoring whistleblowing and a
broad examination of “specific evidence of societal repudiation” of
the employer’s conduct are relevant in weighing the importance of
194
the Restatement policies opposing enforcement. Second, Professor
Dworkin suggests courts should void a contract when non195
enforcement will actually “impact” the policy at stake; that is, courts
should choose non-enforcement when there is “a likelihood that a
196
refusal to enforce the term will further that policy.” This approach
recognizes, however, that the factors of the Restatement, despite their
197
In essence, the core of the inquiry
usefulness, are not dispositive.
must be directed at curtailing and correcting misconduct while
preserving the certainties of contract law and protecting the secrecy
198
of legitimately confidential information.
190

Id. at 161-62.
Id.; see also Bast, supra note 29.
192
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 171.
193
Id. at 181. The first tier, “clarity,” assesses the definiteness and weight of the
policy at issue by first looking to the explicitness of the policy as articulated by the
legislature or the courts, and then at its relative importance. Id. Dworkin argues that
recent legislative and judicial positions unequivocally establish the importance of
whistleblowing. Id. Thus, the considerations in favor of enforcement should be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis in light of societal disapproval of the wrongful
conduct at issue. Id.
The second tier of the analysis, “impact,” is particularly relevant in employmentat-will cases, and further explicates the Restatement inquiry into “the likelihood that
a refusal to enforce the term will further that policy.” Id. (citing RESTATEMENT § 179
cmt. b.). In assessing the impact of non-enforcement on the overall furtherance of
the public good, Dworkin asserts that the most important considerations are the “job
description of the whistleblower and the power to respond possessed by the party to
whom the whistle is blown.” Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 181-84.
194
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 179.
195
Id. at 181-84; see also supra note 183 (discussing “impact”).
196
See RESTATEMENT § 179 cmt. b.
197
Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 187.
198
Bast notes:
two lines of inquiry are most relevant to the decision whether a
confidentiality promise should be enforced against a whistleblower in a
191
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In contrast to Professor Dworkin’s emphasis on the balancing
approach of the Restatement as a useful guide, Professor Carol M.
Bast chooses a more ambitious route and proposes a new test for
199
evaluating non-disclosure provisions. First, Professor Bast observes
that one must begin with the premise that the agreement is generally
enforceable but then asserts that public policy should reflect
fundamental public values, regardless of whether it is reflected in
200
legislation.
Bast finds support for this proposition in the work of
201
Professor Stewart J. Schwab.
Professor Schwab criticizes the
insistence on the part of many courts that a public policy exception
202
He emphasizes that a demand
must be grounded in positive law.
that employees reference specific statutory violations “can lead to
awkward or even tortured analysis” and “can sidetrack the case from
203
the real issues.” Instead, Schwab argues, courts should focus on the
effects of such conduct on third parties, and resolve the issues based
on whether enforcement of the contract will have “substantial adverse
204
third-party effects.”
Expanding Professor Schwab’s thesis, Bast argues that judicial
reluctance to exercise discretion in the absence of positive law may be
underinclusive where positive law does not suffice to protect against a
205
substantial health or safety danger.
Bast asserts that “in the
hierarchy of public policies, safety from physical harm and death
206
ranks at or near the top.” The possible safety risks of enforcement,
however, may sometimes be too remote or speculative to justify non-

particular case. Both address the conflict between societal interests in
reducing and deterring organizational misconduct, on one hand, and
in contract enforcement, on the other.
The essence of this
accommodation is to curtail and correct misconduct while minimizing
the disclosure of legitimately confidential information.
Bast, supra note 29, at 708.
199
Id. at 708; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
200
Bast, supra note 29, at 700-01.
201
Schwab, supra note 28; see also Bast, supra note 29, at 707 (discussing Schwab).
202
Positive law is statutes, legislation, and judicial decisions. Schwab, supra note
28, at 1958.
203
Id. at 1959. Schwab relies on Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., to
demonstrate this point. Id. (discussing Wagenseller, 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)). In
Wagenseller, a nurse was fired for refusing to participate in a skit that involved
mooning the audience. 710 P.2d at 1029. The court insisted on determining
whether there was a statutory violation, and ultimately had to determine whether
mooning violated an Arizona statute against indecent exposure of the anus or
genitals. Id. at 1035 n.5.
204
Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958.
205
Bast, supra note 29, at 706.
206
Id. at 707.
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207

enforcement.
Thus, courts should only invalidate confidentiality
agreements when they present a substantial and imminent threat to
208
public health and safety.
In her conclusion, Professor Bast proposes a six-part test for
determining whether confidentiality agreements should be
209
The test seeks to balance the employer’s interest in
enforced.
210
secrecy against the employee’s and society’s interests in disclosure.
To determine whether a confidentiality agreement should be
enforced, a court should examine the following six factors:
1. what information the parties reasonably expected to be
protected under the confidentiality agreement (reasonable
expectations);
2. any loss to the employer that would result if enforcement were
denied (loss to the employer);
3. the extent to which the information is protectable as a trade
secret or proprietary information (protectability);
4. any substantial adverse third party effect enforcement of the
term would have on third parties (substantial adverse effect on
third parties);
5. the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the term will contribute
to the effect (exacerbation of adverse effect);
6. whether limited disclosure would guard against the effect while
211
still protecting employer’s information (limited disclosure).

Thus, Bast elucidates a test that provides the judiciary with greater
212
flexibility in a framework of guided discretion. Most significant to
the analysis is Bast’s recognition of the significance of third party
213
effects, especially health and public safety.
In sum, that many courts continue to protect whistleblowers
despite the existence of confidentiality agreements suggests that
courts are capable of qualifying private contractual guarantees in
214
light of a clear, countervailing public policy. Some courts, however,
207

Id. at 705-06 (“Health and safety threats should certainly be disclosed where
the danger is substantial and imminent.”).
208
Id.
209
Id. at 709.
210
Id. at 708.
211
Bast, supra note 29, at 709.
212
Id. at 703-04.
213
Id. at 706-07.
214
See Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at 152-53; see also Bast, supra note 29, at
639-42 (discussing how some courts carefully scrutinize confidentiality agreements to
ensure that protection is reasonable in light of the information that is being shielded
and the public interest).
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continue to exercise a stubborn reluctance to act in the absence of a
215
Commentators have posited other
clear legislative articulation.
considerations and even advanced new tests of enforceability that are
216
useful in attempting to resolve the court’s conundrum. Ultimately,
however, courts must strike a balance that protects public health and
safety and yet does not trample parties’ legitimate interests in
217
confidentiality.
VI. ESTABLISHING A ZONE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
It is clear that the pervasive judicial reluctance to act in the
absence of a clear legislative articulation forces courts to indulge in
218
constrained reasoning. Despite the majoritarian principle that the
legislature is in a superior position to perceive the general needs of
the public in a representative society, judicial activism can stimulate
democracy in appropriate instances by responding to public concern
219
and inducing the legislature to act. Although the judiciary should
not be vested with the same unsupervised power it possessed before
220
the evolution of the modern statutory regime, judges must strive to
adopt a more active role in shaping public policy, especially when

215

See, e.g., Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983)
(declining to recognize a claim for wrongful discharge because the legislature had
not yet done so); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974) (disallowing a
wrongful discharge action, and asserting the importance of legislative or statutory
guidance). See also Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958 (discussing judicial reluctance to
act in the absence of positive law).
216
See Bast, supra note 29, at 708; see also Dworkin & Callahan, supra note 34, at
181; Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958.
217
Bast, supra note 29, at 708; see also supra note 198.
218
See, e.g., Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89; Geary, 319 A.2d at 180. See also Schwab, supra
note 28, at 1958 (discussing how statutory reliance can result in awkward results);
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 684 (arguing that reliance on statutes can result in
illogical results).
219
See ALDISERT, supra note 105, at 178. Judge Aldisert argues that, although it
might seem antidemocratic, putting lawmaking power in the hands of judges is not
necessarily inconsistent with democracy because they are not creating final rules. Id.
Judges merely create starting points “that are subject to legislative revisions and
about allocating the burden of inertia.” Id.; see also Alan B. Handler, Judicial
Jurisprudence, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 22 (“Even a court’s provisional answer to social
problems can be a part of a dynamic by which policy is forged and law, as an
expression of public policy and social authority, evolves and progresses.”); Michael
Heise, Preliminary Thoughts on the Virtues of Passive Dialogue, 34 AKRON L. REV. 73
(2000); Erin Rahne Kidwell, The Paths of the Law: Historical Consciousness, Creative
Democracy, and Judicial Review, 62 ALB. L. REV. 91 (1998).
220
See 1 W. STORY, supra note 62, at 675; see also Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 679
(arguing that with the birth of the modern regulatory regime the legislature replaced
the judiciary as the dictator of public policy).
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221

public danger is evident.
The sexual abuse scandal within the Catholic Church highlights
the problems that arise when courts enforce contracts without
222
considering the public welfare. Courts must recognize their duty to
scrutinize any agreement that would sacrifice safety in favor of
223
secrecy.
For example, the non-disclosure agreements used in
224
225
Giannecchini and in Catholic Church settlements pose obvious
dangers to public health and safety by depriving society of vital
information. The difficulty is striking the proper balance between
226
contractual guarantees and the public’s right to know.
In fashioning a new approach, the analysis in Giannecchini
227
provides a good reference point. Aware of the danger to the public
in enforcing a provision that would protect a medical professional’s
record of poor performance, the Giannecchini court did not

221

Several recent cases indicate a growing judicial disinclination to enforce
confidentiality agreements that present a substantial likelihood of public harm. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512 (D. Mass.), modified, 94 F.3d 738 (1st
Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Rush Prudential Health Plans, No. 97 C 3823, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4170, at *8-12 (E.D. Ill. April 1, 1998) (voiding a confidentiality clause that
prohibited disclosure of the amount of settlement). See also Dworkin & Callahan,
supra note 34, at 163. For example, in EEOC v. Astra U.S.A., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512 (D.
Mass.), modified, 94 F.3d 738 (1st Cir. 1996), the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission sought to prevent enforcement of confidentiality agreements that
prohibited current and former Astra employees from cooperating in an investigation
of wrongful conduct. Id. The fact that a government agency was the party seeking
relief is significant, but the court’s reasoning is still quite relevant. Id. In granting
the injunction against enforcement of the agreements, the court stressed that “a
promise is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the
circumstances by a public policy harmed by the enforcement of the agreement.” Id.
at 518 (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
222
See Goodstein, supra note 1 (discussing how confidential settlements allows
pedophile priests to remain anonymous); see also Robinson, supra note 7 (discussing
Judge McWeeny’s decision to unseal documents relating to sexual abuse of minors by
priests); Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing sexual abuse suits against former priest
John Geoghan).
223
See generally Bast, supra note 29 (arguing that courts should focus on public
health and safety when evaluating non-disclosure provisions).
224
Giannecchini v. Hosp. of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2000) (discussing that allowing medical professionals to shield records of their poor
job performance through the use of non-disclosure agreements may lead to
unreliable medical care).
225
See, e.g., Ranalli, supra note 1 (discussing the use of confidentiality agreements
in connection with twenty-four cases of sexual abuse brought against former priest
John Geoghan); Charter, supra note 6, at Preamble (“In the past, secrecy has created
an atmosphere that has inhibited the healing process and, in some cases, enabled
sexually abusive behavior to be repeated.”).
226
Bast, supra note 29, at 708.
227
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1010-13.
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228

reflexively enforce the contract.
Instead, the court went one step
further and referenced the relevant statutory provisions regarding
229
disclosure of employee personnel records. Both parties argued that
the legislature had explicitly contemplated the protection of an
230
employee’s personnel records by a non-disclosure contract.
Although it is arguable whether Connecticut law clearly answered the
question, the court’s careful consideration of public safety and its
thorough examination of the relevant statutes provide a useful
231
paradigm for evaluating non-disclosure provisions.
Courts must begin with a few necessary concessions to the law’s
interests in certainty and predictability. First, as Professor Bast
acknowledged, the courts must start with the general proposition that
232
the agreement is enforceable. Second, as Walter Gellhorn asserted,
courts should reference any relevant legislation as the “starting point”
233
of any inquiry into uncharted territory.
Finally, as the drafters of
the Second Restatement have suggested, judges should utilize
234
legislation to enhance their understanding of the policy at stake.
Unless it clearly dictates a particular result, however, legislation
should only be a judicial guidepost—one factor considered in the
235
analysis.
Judges must have discretion to void a contract that is
injurious to fundamental public interests, even if legislation does not
236
reflect an applicable policy.
The issue then is how courts should utilize relevant legislation
when evaluating a non-disclosure contract. Federal preemption
doctrine provides a sound theoretical approach to determining the
237
effect legislation should have on the analysis.
Under federal
preemption analysis, courts determine whether a federal regulation
228

See id. at 1011.
Id. (discussing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-128e, f (2001)); see supra notes 49-54
and accompanying text.
230
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011; see also supra notes 46 & 54 and accompanying
text (discussing the Giannecchini court’s conclusion that the Connecticut legislature
had explicitly considered all issues regarding disclosure of employee personnel
records).
231
Giannecchini, 780 A.2d at 1011.
232
Bast, supra note 29, at 700.
233
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685.
234
RESTATEMENT §179 cmt. b.
235
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685.
236
Bast, supra note 29, at 706 (arguing that positive law may be underinclusive
when it fails to protect against substantial health and safety dangers).
237
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (discussing federal preemption analysis). See
also Hoke, supra note 26, at 699-700 (laying out the three categories of federal
preemption).
229
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or legislative scheme displaces a state constitutional or statutory
238
Federal preemption can be used as a defense when a
remedy.
federal law bars compliance with, or relief on the basis of, a state or
239
local law.
Thus, in determining whether to enforce a nondisclosure contract, courts should first look to the relevant state
and/or federal statutory provisions to determine if the regulatory
scheme in effect “preempts” an independent discretionary judgment
that a contract is unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
Preemption analysis generally divides into three categories:
express preemption, implied field preemption, and conflict
240
preemption.
The court, focusing on the plain meaning of the
statutory language, will find express preemption when a federal
241
statute clearly and explicitly preempts state law. When there is no
express preemption provision, the court looks to whether the federal
242
statute impliedly preempts the state law. Implied field preemption
occurs when a federal regulatory scheme is so pervasive as to displace
243
all state regulation.
Conflict preemption occurs when state and
federal law are inconsistent, thus rendering compliance with both an
244
impossibility.
Ultimately, preemption analysis determines whether Congress
245
intended to supersede state law.
In order to ensure that
congressional intent is clear, courts employ the “clear statement”
246
rule. The “clear statement” rule ensures that “the legislature has in
238

See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 203; see also Hoke, supra note 26, at 699-700.
See Hoke, supra note 26, at 691.
240
Betsey J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 559, 566 (1997).
241
Id. For example, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., the Supreme Court held that the
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C.S. § 606 (2003), preempted a state law
allowing deviations from weights stated on meat packaging. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
Specifically, Section 678 of the FMIA expressly prohibits “[m]arking labeling,
packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made
under” the Act. Jones, 430 U.S. at 530 (citing 21 U.S.C.S. § 678 (2003)); see also THE
LAW OF PREEMPTION 16 n.60 (Appellate Judges Conference, American Bar Association
eds., 1991) (“Other well-known preemption provisions are found in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982), the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1982), and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).”).
242
Grey, supra note 240, at 566.
243
Id. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (holding that
the United States Warehouse Act preempted state law by occupying the field because
not only did it make federal law paramount over state law in event of conflict but it
also terminated the dual system of regulation).
244
Grey, supra note 240, at 566.
245
Id. at 564.
246
Id. at 609.
239
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fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters
247
Courts begin with the assumption that
involved in the decision.”
federal regulation does not supersede the states’ police powers unless
248
Congress’ intent is absolutely clear. In the absence of preemption,
states retain the Tenth Amendment right to protect the safety and
249
welfare of its citizenry.
Using federal preemption analysis as a guide, courts should first
determine if a statute expressly dictates a particular result and, if so,
250
apply the statute. If there is no clear legislative articulation of the
policy at stake, courts should next determine whether there is field
preemption; that is, whether the relevant statutory scheme is so
251
pervasive that it dictates a particular result.
The ultimate goal of
referencing statutes should be to determine whether the legislature
has already considered and made a clear determination of the
252
competing policy interests at stake. If it has, the court is bound to
adhere to that judgment.
If the legislature is silent on the issue or has not clearly
elucidated a relevant policy, however, courts should have broad
discretion to balance the equities in favor of and against
enforcement. Judges should begin with the general assumption that,
in the absence of a clear expression of statutory intent, they retain
the discretion to void a contractual provision that offends public
policy. Essentially, the absence of a definitive legislative articulation
253
creates a zone of judicial discretion. Judges should not ignore their
duty to the public and decline to act because the legislature has not
provided an answer. When the legislature has not clearly spoken, the
247

Id. at 610.
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 242 (1998) [hereinafter 16A AM. JUR.].
For example, in P.R. Dep’t. of Consumer Affairs v. ISLA Petroleum Corp., the Supreme
Court held, which although ISLA presented fragments of legislative history that
supported their assertion that the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act preempted
Puerto Rico’s regulation of gasoline prices, the statutory language was not sufficiently
clear to support a finding of preemption. 485 U.S. 495, 501-03 (1988). The
Supreme Court emphasized that congressional intent could not be ascertained by
viewing legislative history in a vacuum, without referencing statutory text “to which
expressions of preemptive intent in legislative history might attach.” Id.; see also THE
LAW OF PREEMPTION, supra note 240, at 17-18 (discussing P.R. Dep’t. of Consumer
Affairs, 485 U.S. 495).
249
16A AM. JUR., supra note 248, at 142.
250
See supra note 246 & 247 and accompanying text.
251
Grey, supra note 240, at 566. Conflict preemption is clearly inapplicable
because its application is limited to statutory conflict. Id.
252
Id.
253
See Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 685 (“Public policies may well be served by the
existence of a twilight zone in which steps are taken but cautiously.”).
248
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courts should speak as the voice of the public.
In the absence of statutory “preemption,” the courts’ main
inquiry should be whether the agreement before them creates a
substantial health or safety danger which outweighs enforcement,
254
similar to the approach taken by the New York courts. As Professor
Bast notes, the significance of the public policy behind protecting the
255
public from physical harm and death is paramount. Following the
suggestions of Professor Schwab, the court should focus its inquiry on
256
the potential adverse third-party effects of the agreement.
Ultimately, even if the potential harms are speculative, the manifest
importance of safeguarding the public from harm must supersede
257
any private interests at stake.
The courts are best equipped to
decide when the causal connections between non-disclosure and
public harm become too attenuated to interfere with enforcement of
258
a contract.
As illustrated by the overwhelming response of all state
legislatures in the whistleblowing context, the courts have the power
to respond to modern realities and provide the impetus for effective
259
legislative response. A judicial policy of deference to the legislature
perpetuates a cycle of inaction—the courts refuse to act, defer to the
260
legislature, and then the legislature declines the invitation to act.
Judicial activism in this area will re-enforce democracy because it will
force the legislature either to remain silent or to speak clearly on
261
policy questions before them.
The judiciary must force the
legislature to act by making a clear statement that contractual secrecy
is not absolute when public safety is at stake.

254

See, e.g., Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 216 A.D.2d 360 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1995) (discussing New York’s whistleblowing statutory scheme’s emphasis on
public health and safety). See also Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 168, at 116-18.
255
Bast, supra note 29, at 707.
256
Schwab, supra note 28, at 1958 (asserting that courts should focus on whether
enforcement of a non-disclosure contract will have adverse third party effects).
257
See Bast, supra note 29, at 706 (arguing that “[b]ecause of the importance of
health and safety, perhaps disclosure should be allowed where the danger is not
quite so substantial or so imminent”).
258
Id.
259
See generally Callahan, supra note 168, 99-100 (discussing the emergence of
whistleblower legislation in all fifty states).
260
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
261
Id.
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CONCLUSION
There has never been a better time for brave judges to
acknowledge the societal risks involved in enforcing confidential
262
settlement contracts.
The sexual abuse scandal in the Catholic
Church has exposed the severe consequences of allowing parties to
use confidentiality contracts to silence abuse victims at the expense of
263
the public.
The danger of routine enforcement of confidentiality
contracts, however, is much more pervasive and extends beyond this
single scandal. Judges must strive to adopt a more active role in
crafting broad social policy by refusing to enforce non-disclosure
contracts that threaten public welfare, even in the absence of an
authoritative legislative declaration. In the absence of a clear
expression of legislative intent, courts should be vested with broad
discretion to balance contractual guarantees and public welfare.
When public health and safety is at stake, a contract should never
outweigh the public’s right to know.

262

See Robinson, supra note 7 (discussing Judge McWeeny’s decision to unseal
documents concealing sexual abuse by priests).
263
See Goodstein, supra note 1; see also Grossman, supra note 8; Robinson, supra
note 7.

